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INTRODUCTION
Morality, understood as the underlying beliefs and values that guide
our choices, permeates our personal and professional lives. The Jepson
School places a great deal of emphasis on moral leadership, for the
importance of leading with a core set of values is discussed in nearly every
class.

Via my Jepson School experience, I have become sensitive to the

issues surrounding the ethical decision-making process, and believe that
this area is worthy of study.

As a student leader, I have been faced with

many situations that required moral or ethical decisions.

As I hopefully

join the legal profession, the need for moral decisions will most likely
become even greater.
An interesting aspect of the legal profession is the judiciary, which
often relies on a multitude_ of rules and precedents.

Many believe that

judges cannot always speatate themselves from their moral values, while
others feel that this is·· necessary for the proper administration of justice.
In many situations, having the legal right to do or decide something can be
quite different from the morally or ethically "right" act.

Therefore, the

major issue to be addressed in this project is that of morality and its role
in the judicial decision-making process.

I will examine what experts

believe is the proper role for morality in the courtroom, as well as whether
or not judges are moral leaders.
American society has become increasingly entrenched in litigation.
Subsquently, the perception of increased litigation has placed the legal
profession under an immense amount of scrutiny.

The ongoing debate

about the role of morals in the courtroom, which this project will address.
is particularly relevant because so many court decisions affect our daily

A detailed examination of the issues of morality and the role of

lives.

morals m the courtroom is important, for it will enable us to better
comprehend the dilemmas that many judges face as well as clarify what
many believe is the proper place for morals.

As leaders, judges make

decisions that we are required to follow, so examining the impact of moral
values on this form of leadership will provide insight into why and how
judges act in many situations.

Hopefully, this project will uncover many of

the complexities that judges face in terms of morality and moral decision�
making.
LITERATURE REVIEW

IS MORALITY RELEVANT IN THE JUDICIARY?
Judges have played an increasingly vital role in American society.
With the proliferation of litigation, judges on all levels are beginning to
affect thousands of Americans' personal lives each day.

Events such as the

Senate confirmation hearings that focused on abortion during the
nominations of Judges Haynsworth, Jr., Carswell, and Bork as well as
impeachment proceedings to remove federal judges have piqued interest
in judicial conduct.1

Some experts argue that the Senate inquiries about

the intellectual qualifications of Supreme Court nominees David Souter and
Clarence Thomas were about little else than abortion.2

This increased

focus on moral issues has raised several challenging questions about the
type of role that judges should fulfill.
Perhaps one of the most intriguing, albeit controversial, issues

concerns judges and their role as moral leaders.

Many would dispute the

notion that judges are, in fact, leaders, and would say that morality has
little or nothing to do wjth a judge's role as arbitrator.

To some, the

judiciary lacks the moral competence to promote a vision of American
moral

aspirations. 3

Stil1, others would contend that morals should and

must be incorporated into judicial deliberations, and that judges have, in
fact, become moral leaders of our nation.

The courtroom, according to

some, is the only place in the community where moral law is laid down, for
entities such as churches, clubs, and families have failed to instill a strong
moral code into the citizenry.4 Regardless of the view that one supports, it
is difficult to dispute that judges must balance the detachment inherent in
their offices with the values that permeate their personal Iives. s
One view of this topic is that judges are not and cannot be moral
leaders.

Morality, then, under this view, should have very little to do with

judicial decision-making.

When deliberating a case, some scholars believe

that judges should mainly consider facts, laws, and precedents. as well as
the influence of the judge's individual character. 6

From this perspective, a

judge, unlike a leader, should not be expected to lead by "the pull of
inspiring va1ues".7

Judges are seen as an exception, for the relevant

aspects of a judge's character does not include morality.

An intuitive sense

of fairness, an understanding of the real world, and the capacity to
continue learning are seen as the important aspects of a judge's character. 8
The courtroom and judges' chambers are viewed as forums in which
neutrality and fairness are superior to values and morals.
According to some legal scholars. law and morality, as separate
3

entities, must be considered in exclusion to one another, for laws are not
always or necessarily

moral.9

Since laws do not, by definition or fact,

conform to the existing community morality, judges should refrain from
imposing their values on the decision�making process.

Therefore, judicial

interpretation of laws cannot be a moral exercise.
The perspective that the Constitution is the major guiding force of
values to our nation would perhaps lead one to believe that judges, as
interpreters of this document, are moral leaders.
a

skewed

misrepresentation of reality. to

This view, some argue, is

Although the Constitution is the

framework of our national government and guarantor of fundamental
liberties, it has little to say about the values that should be most important
to us as individuals and as a community.

Debate about this issue,

according to this viewpoint, must be grounded in legal sources and legal
analysis.

The Constitution was not intended to become a moral guide, so

those responsible for interpreting and applying it should not serve as
national

"guidance

counselors".l 1

Proponents of the view that judges are not moral leaders would
argue that judges are not selected or appointed because of their eminence
as philosophers or their insights as moralists.

On the contrary, they are

selected by their potential ability to render decisions that society can
recognize as straightforward interpretations of a constitutional or statutory
text. I 2 The role of judges, then, is to determine the principles incorporated
into the Constitution and apply them to concrete individua1 cases, while
avoiding an evaluation of the wisdom or value of the policies at issue. 1 3
Who, if not the judiciary, is responsible for instilling a sense of values
4

in the citizenry?

Some may argue that the legislature, elected to create

laws to lead society, are the major players.

Others contend that the "soul

of American life" lies in the law-free spaces, where social life is left to the
regulation of norms other than those of state-guaranteed law. I 4
Consequently, churches, families, and communities should function as our
moral leaders.

If the judiciary were responsible for defining social values,

this role rightfully reserved for the intermediary institutions listed above
would be

undermined. I 5 In sum, many would contend that judges are not

moral leaders because their decision-making process and the laws that
they evaluate are not moral in nature, the Constitution which they
interpret is not a moral document, judges were not selected to serve as
moral leaders, and the role of moral leader should be fulfilled by other non
governmental

entities.

Although many believe that moral leadership has no place in the
judiciary, there is an alernative perspective on this issue.

Research based

on the alternate perspective reveals several insights: morality and law are
not always possible to separate;

professional expectations of the judiciary

can send mixed messages concerning the relationship between judges and
their values; and there is a great deal of controversy among legal experts
surrounding the topic.

Despite the previously discussed views that

morality has no place in the judiciary, I believe that the above reasons are
sufficient grounds to construct an argument promoting the view that
morality and morals do, indeed, play a significant role in the judiciary.
Morality and law, as some would argue, are not always distinct from
one another, for there are myriad circumstances in which individuals may

5

choose to disobey the law on moral grounds.

The law often demands

socially-acceptable "moral" behavior, and disobeying such laws brings
morality and law into direct contact. I 6

Problems arise with the

subjectivity of morality, for different spiritual, ethnic, and racial groups
could have widely divergent morals.

In some cases, scholars argue that

when a law violates a moral right, the citizen has a moral right to disobey
the law as such. 1 7 Such occurrences could lead to legal struggles, which
could easily necessitate a judicial decision.

In cases such as these, it would

be nearly impossible to separate a judge's moral views from the decision
making process of the case.
Both the personal and professional expectations placed on judges
constitute another dimension of this debate.

In order to remain impartial

and avoid the appearance of impropriety, judges are expected to maintain
a certain distance between themselves and the practicing bar as well as
personal contacts. ts There exists a great expectation for judges to be
impartial, to not incorporate their personal values in decision-making, and
to practice "blind" justice through merely evaluating the facts and
precedents involved in each case.

However, potential Supreme Court

justices are sometimes asked about their position on the moral/religious/
ethical issue of abortion. I 9

This type of questioning creates a paradox, for

judges are expected to separate their morals from their decisions, yet are
asked about their personal

moral beliefs on volatile issues.

Some scholars have acknowledged this discrepancy, while others do
not believe that such a discrepancy exists.
another issue worthy of analysis.

This controversy serves as

Some experts believe that there appears
6

to be a widely-shared expectation that judges will sometimes rely on
personal moral knowledge. 20 In fact� some argue that morals, especially
religious faith. cannot be "shrugged off like an unattractive article of
clothing. "21

Some would go further in suggesting that "occasional reliance

by judges on religious convictions is not improper", and that reliance by
judges on their personal religious convictions is as proper as reliance on
their personal moral convictions of any other kind. 22

According to some

experts, whether or not we live in a nation in which judges are frequently
expected to rely on moral knowledge in reaching their decisions is
debatable23.

This is a fundamental reason why this topic should be

addressed,
What is the role of morality in relationship to the bench?

Morality,

according to many, goes "hand-in-hand ft with the judiciary. Historically,
there has been a focus on holding judges accountable for moral behavior.
In 1924, the American Bar Association created the original Canons of
Judicial Ethics.

The Canons were intended to be a guide of behavior rather

than an enforceable set of rules, and were criticized for their emphasis on
"moral posturing".
Judicial Conduct.

Therefore, in 1972 the ABA created its Model Code of
This Code is designed to be enforceable, and has been

adopted by nearly every state and the District of Columbia.

Montana,

Rhode Island, and Wisconsin remain as non-code states, and have adopted
their own rules of conduct that are similar to the Code. 24
In general, the Code provides that judges should uphold the integrity
and independence of the judiciary, should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities, and should perform the
7

duties of their office impartially and diligently.25

However, there is not a

single mention of the word "moral" in the Code, and there are not
standards that punish judges for "immoral" acts. 26

The Code focuses on

concepts such as integrity, expediency, and impartiallity.
enforcement,

permanent

state agencies charged

with

In terms of
investigating

allegations of judicial misconduct hold hearings to make findings of fact
and recommend or order sanctions when violations of the code are
found27,
For those who argue that morality should not and does not play a
role in the judiciary, this system would seem to be an adequate mechanism
through which to monitor illegal or improper actions.

There is no mention

of morality in the regulations, and there are no punishments per se
immoral acts.

for

The Code and the system designed to enforce it, however,

can be misleading.

Indeed, there have been numerous instances when

judges have been punished for conduct found

ruu to

be in violation of the

Code. In essence, these judges were reprimanded for committing acts that
their peers felt were "wrong" for a judge to engage in.

Despite the facts

that a written rule prohibiting their actions did not exist and that they
would be found innocent if evaluated strictly in terms of the Code, these
individuals were penalized for performing acts that a judge technically
could, but should

not, do.

Many examples illustrating this type of

situation can be found, but only a few are necessary to communicate the
notion that judges actually are held accountable for acts that reflect their
moral

values.
In a California case, intemperate or offensive personal conduct that
8

did not violate the criminal law or Code nonetheless gave rise to judicial
discipline.

In Getler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, the California

Supreme Court removed a judge from office, citing his "crude and offensive
conduct in public places".

The judge in question repeatedly had used

vulgar language in public and had made offensive sexual gestures to
numerous individuals.

The court concluded that "the ultimate standard for

judicial conduct must be conduct which constantly reaffirms fitness for the
high responsibilities of judicial office. "28 To the court, conduct that was
technically legal but morally wrong was unacceptable: "It is immaterial
that the conduct concerned was probably lawful, albeit unjudicial, or that
the petitioner may have perceived his offensive and harassing conduct as
low-humored

horseplay. "29 The judge in this case seemed to be held to a

higher moral standard than the "ordinary" citizen.

Therefore, it seems that

this value placed on moral and proper conduct signals a concern for a
certain moral level among the judiciary.
This focus on placing judges on a higher plane than the average
citizen was also echoed in an Ohio case.

The Ohio Supreme Court

disciplined a judge who "admitted that he, while still married to, but
separated form, his wife, took his "girl friend" (now his second wife) with
him, at his expense, on a trip to Majorca and two trips to Mexico, but he
testified that they did not occupy the same room on any of the trips. "30
The court held that it was irrelevant whether the judge's conduct was no
different from that of an ordinary person, since "improper conduct which
may be overlooked when committed by the ordinary person ... cannot be
overlooked when committed by a judge.
9

By accepting his office, a judge

undertakes to conduct himself in both his official and personal behavior in
accordance with the highest
expect. "31

standard [emphasis added] that society can

By holding judges to a higher standard than the rest of society,

we expect them to behave in a more ethical, professional, and moral
manner.

Those who espouse the notion that judges should separate

themselves from their morals may be asking for the impossible, for we, as
a society, expect them to be positive role models as moral citizens.

It is

both unfair and improbable to separate judges from morality, for, as is
shown in the examples above, their conduct is united to society's views of
morality.

In addition, this practice is futile because, if we continue to insist

on pefection of character, we are unlikely to find many exemplary
leaders. 32

Although judges do have a call to act responsible because of the

professional position that they are in, it is unfair and illogical to hold them
to such a high standard and then claim that morals do not play a
significant role in a judge's professional life.
The issues that many judges deal with also makes it essential for
them to utilize their own sense of morals.

Every case that the judiciary

deliberates cannot always be decided on the basis of precedent and law.
Illustrations of this are also abundant.

A juvenile court judge, for example,

may have to decide which parent is more fit to raise an abused child.
judge cannot rely solely on laws or precedents.

The

Each case of this nature

must be decided on an individual basis, and most likely will involve some
moral decisions on behalf of the judge.

In another scenario, a judge may

have to decide under an immigration statute whether an applicant is of
"good moral character". 33

Surely, this would entail the application of moral
1 0

judgment.

Consider the issue of reproductive freedom.

Whether the judge

claims to be enforcing the community's moral norms or updating the moral
vision of the Founding Fathers, it is quite evident that the judge cannot
make such decisions without relying, at least in part, on her own moral
knowledge. 34 There are simply too many issues that seem to require moral
judgment to discount the notion that judges must lead and deliberate in a
moral fashion.
In difficult cases such as these, it remains the judge's duty to
discover what the rights of the parties are, but not to invent new rights.
When no settled rule dictates a decision, a judge should base the decision
on both on "the morality that is embedded in the traditions of the common
law" and his or her personal political morality.

In essence, there exists a

"pervasive interaction" between the two types of morality.35

Although the

judge is responsible for making a decision that is consistent in the
application of the principle relied upon3 6, morality does permeate the
process.
The inter-relatedness between law and morality is another reason
why we cannot separate judges from their morals.

Morality, understood as

the beliefs and values that guide our choices, must play a part in the
creation, interpretation, and enforcement of laws.

Contrary to the views

discussed earlier, law can be seen as an expression of public morality
because a variety of those involved in its creation, interpretation, and
enforcement are somewhat influenced by their perceptions of what is just,
fair, and true.3 7 Judges, as part of this process, cannot completely disown
their own sense of values and morals, for it is this sense of "right and
1 l

wrong" that p.layed a major role in the formation of the issues that the
court must deliberate.

In a sense, not utilizing one's sense of values would

run contrary to the process that had carried the issue at hand to the
judiciary.

Especially when involved with controversial political decisions,

judges do and must rest their judgments on arguments of principle, not
strictly policy or precedent. 3 8
In addition to incorporating their values into decisions, one could
argue that the judiciary, especially the federal branch, is in a unique
position to serve as moral leaders.

Due to its political insularity, the

federal judiciary has the institutional advantage that affords it the capacity
to engage in the pursuit of political-moral knowledge in a relatively
disinterested

manner. 39 Political-moral knowledge can be seen as a search

for answers to the various questions as to how we should live.40 Although
somewhat less true for other levels of the judiciary; this concept could still
be applied because of the separation from many segments of society that is
expected from all judges.

This is not to suggest that judges can or should

be moral "prophets" or that other branches of government aren't capable
of effective moral leadership.

However, the judiciary, due to its isolation

and political insularity (on the federal level), is institutionally advantaged
in dealing with controversial moral issues, for they are not concerned with
re-election, political agendas, or answering to voters. 41
Another institutional advantage that allows the courts to engage in
moral discourse is the fact that the courts, unlike the legislative and
executive branches, are concerned with the specific issues of an actual
case.

This tends to lengthen everyone's view, which is conducive to
12

"thinking things, not words, and thus to the evolution of principle."

Due to

these advantages, a judge is better able to rely (at least somewhat) on her
own beliefs when deciding cases:
An advantage that the courts have is that questions of principle never
carry the same aspect for them as they did for the legislature or the
executive. Statutes, after all, deal typically with abstract or dimly
forseen problems. The courts are concerned with the flesh and blood of an
actual case. This tends to modify, perhaps lengthen, everyone's view .. .it is
conducive ...to thinking things, not words, and thus to the evolution of
"42
· · I e ....
pnnctp

The nature of the Constitution is another factor that justifies the
position that judges must use personal judgment and values when
adjudicating a case.

The major question in settling this issue is whether we

have a Constitution of detail or of principle.
straightforward:

The answer is relatively

"ordinary legal interpretation supports the principled

rather than the detailed understanding of the Constitution. "43

Those who

favor a detailed interpretation, and who advocate the stance that the
Constitution is anything but a moral document, argue that a detailed view
leaves state legislatures free to act in many ways unrestricted by the
federal government (as intended by the framers when they wrote the Bill
of Rights).

Consquently, a judge must merely pay attention to the legal

arguments while ignoring the political ones.

These scholars would also say

that a utilization of the principled view ignores legal arguments and relies
only on personal or political ones (such as Justice Blackmun's decision in
Roe v. Wade )44.

However, this argument is flawed, for a constitution of

principle is "a precondition

[emphasis in original] of legitimate democracy"
1 3

for a government required to treat individual citizens as equals, and to
respect their fundamental liberties and dignity.

Unless these conditions

are met, there can be no genuine democracy, for without them the
majority would have no legitimate moral title to govern4 5.

A judge, then,

must utilize his or her morals when interpreting the Constitution.

Of

course, there must be limits on a judge's power to interpret the
Constitution according to his or her own convictions:

judges must justify

their decisions through arguments of principle and integrity, which the
legal profession can criticize, and which the public, (who elect judges or
whose influence should be felt by those who nominate judges) can sensibly
assess.46
As previously discussed, judges may be held to higher professional
and personal standards than the average citizen.

However, a factor that

one cannot discount is the influence of a judge's subconscious on his or her
decision-making.

Some experts claim that the influence of the

subconscious necessitates that a judge will, perhaps unknowingly, utilize
personal values.

Indeed, "deep below the conscious are other forces, the

likes and the dislikes, the predilections and prejudices, the complex of
instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man,
whether he be litigant or judge. "4 7

Perhaps judges cannot be fairly

expected to separate themselves from the rest of society, for "the great
tides and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in their
course, and pass the judges by. ".4 8

The ideal of completely separating

oneself from the case at hand "is beyond the reach of human facilities to
attain" .49 One of the nation's great leaders would agree with the belief that
1 4

such objectivity is impossible, for, as President Roosevelt told Congress rn
"The decisions of the courts on economic and social questions

1908:

depend upon their [judges] economic and social philosophy. ", 50

Indeed, it

would be futile to try to "overthrow utterly and at all times the empire of
these subconscious loyalties... for never will these loyalties be utterly
distinguished while human nature is what it is'1.5 I

The inability to

completely subdue these forces of individualism will not hinder the
judicial process. for "the eccentricities of judges balance one another; ... out
of the attrition of diverse minds there is beaten something which has a
constancy and uniformity and average value greater than its component
elements. ft ,52

Put rather simply, one should not even consider whether or

not a judge should
Judges cannot

incorporate personal morals into decision-making,

neglect their values, for human nature makes this

impossible.
ARE JUDGES MORAL LEADERS?
Through this discourse about how judges are involved in moral
decision-making, one can extend this notion to state that judges are moral
leaders.

The definition of a leader is quite elusive, but there are several

characterstics that a judge exemplifies that many would equate to
leadership.

A leader guides his or her followers, and utilizes knowledge

and expertise to make decisions for the benefit of her constituents.
through their decisions, share this trait of a leader.

Judges,

However, the

comparison goes a step further. A moral leader also serves as a role model
to the followers, and should always act according to a core set of values.
15

As previously discussed, judges are placed on a higher moral level than the
rest of society;

thus, they can be seen as moral role models.

Like leaders, judges will not be able to lead without credibility.

They

are in possession of two sources of credibility:

the status of their office

and the way in which they adjudicate justice.

Concerning the latter

category, a judge must function with honesty and integrity.

Honesty was

the most highly selected leadership characteristic chosen in a study
conducted from 1987-1995 that utilized surveys to identify desirable
leadership traits.

"Moral-neutral" characteristics such as being fair-

minded, intelligent, straightforward, and mature were not ranked any
where near honesty.

The resarchers found that people want ethical,

principled, honest leaders who maintain a high sense of integrity.
Although judges were not specifically targeted in the study, the fact that
.. nearly 90% of constituents want their leaders to be honest above all else
is a message that all leaders must take to heart." . s 3
Another finding was that "we simply don't trust people who won't
tell us their values, ethics, and standards. H .54 This seems to communicate
the idea that judges are actually expected to be moral leaders by most of
society. Additionally, because judges are held strictly accountable for their
actions, they must consistently operate from their own core set of values if
they are to initiate and structure a national discussion on fundamental
values and morality.55 Indeed. for most involved in legal education, law is
seen as intertwined with moral philosophy, and court adjudication is the
preferred vehicle for molding American character.56 Judges obviously play
a pivotal role in this process.
16

As moral leaders, judges must balance the needs of their followers
The combination of these two

with the fair administration of justice.

concerns, when applied to the judiciary, create an image that the courts are
a leader in areas such as social reform and civil liberties.5 7 The decisions of
the courts, especially at the federal level, help shape the way that we live
and teach us what is socially acceptable behavior.
Wade and Brown v. Board of Education

Cases such as Roe v.

are specific examples of when the

Court led the nation in new and different directions.

Although these cases

lacked moral declarations, they nonetheless told the nation that it was time
to make a significant change.
Mora1ity and its relationship to the judiciary has been a topic of
intense discussion in and out of the legal profession.

While many believe

that judges are merely arbitrators of justice, others argue that judges are
integral moral leaders of our society.

This author agrees with the concept

that judges are moral leaders, for they are held to a higher moral standard
compared to the rest of society, constantly deliberate moral issues, are a
part of the inter-relatedness of law and morality, and are in an
institutionally advantaged position to contend with moral dilemmas.

In

addition, the principled nature of our Constitution as well as characteristics
associated with human nature would qualify judges as moral leaders.
One cannot expect judges to completely divorce their morals from
their cognitive processes.

Judges should not abuse their power to enforce

their morals on society.

However, they have an obligation as moral leaders

to incorporate their sense of values (along with knowledge of facts,
precedents, and law) when making decisions. Judges must consider legal
17

creating a track of legal courses centered around ethics and morality.
Most law schools do not extensivley 'involve their students with these
topics, and some claim that this may be a part of the reason why many
lawyers are subject to scrutiny for immoral or unethical practices.
addition, I plan to submit an article based on this project to The
l&rukrshio

Studies.

In

of

Journal

This article will be unique due to the facts that it

addresses such a controversial topic and that it will be written by those
involved in the field of leadership studies.

Presently, most of the

literature in the Journal is submitted by fields other than Jeadership, and
this article will exhibit the fact that the Jepson School is committed to
confronting

difficult

leadership

issues.

PROJECT RESULTS
RESULTS _FRQM_Tiffi__EQRUM. JNTERYlE_WS. AND COURT OBSERVATIONS
Through active engagement with nine experts in the fields of law and
ethics, certain attitudes and beliefs were discovered that validate many of
the findings discussed in the literature review.

Personal and phone

interviews were conducted with su of the experts, two sessions of one
expert's court were completed, and the forum, titled "Leadership from the
Bench:

Are Morals Irrelevant?" exhibited the views of five experts59.

primary (but not only) issues addressed during these activities were:
whether or not judges are, indeed, leaders;
judicial decision-making process;

The
1)

2) the role of morals in the

3) whether or not judges are moral

leaders; and 4) whether or not personal conduct has an impact on a judge's
1 9

professional responsibilities.

It should be noted that each interviewee and

panelist did not necessarily answer all of the same questions.
some questions have more responses than others.

Therefore,

Again, the purpose of

this phase of the project was to confirm or refute the arguments put forth
in the literature review.
Each expert agreed that judges were leaders, but fe1t that they lead
in different ways.

One interviewee did not classify judges as leaders in

general, but conceded that they do lead m the procedural aspects and
administration of justice.

Another noted that judges are not leaders in the

tradtional sense, in that they do not have a followership who follow them
on a purely voluntary basis.

For this individual, the important role that

judges play in terms of leadership is when one must make decisions where
there are gaps in the law.

Two days of observation of the Richmond

Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (presided over by one of the judges
studied) provided many examples that validate this claim.

On numerous

occasions, the judge was required to decide what sanctions were "fair"
sanctions in terms of spousal abuse, what would be "proper" visitation
rights, and what would be *in the best interest" of many children.

Void of

precedent or clearly defined statutes, the judge had to "fill in the gaps" and
make a
decision for the best interests of those involved.

Although it was only

possible to view two sessions of this court, the examples nonetheless
support the claim made earlier that judges cannot always neglect their
morals.

In fact, during instances such as those just mentioned, moral

values can be a pivotal guiding influence on a judge's discretionary power,
and can work in conjuction legal guidelines.

20

The remamrng seven respondents agreed that judges are leaders, but
m varying degrees.

One respondent viewed the leadership of a judge as

mainly that of a role model, for judges lead by example and consultation of
other judges, while six contended that the precedents that judges set and
the importance of their decision-making definitely qualify them as leaders.
One made the observation that the perception of a judge's capacity for
power and influence was vital, and places him or her on a different level
than the rest of society.

This supports the research claim that, because of a

judge's potential for power and status, a judge is held to a higher standard
than the rest of society.

In sum, all agreed that judges functioned as

leaders in some capacity, but did not agree with the specific type of
leadership that judges exhibit.
Perhaps the most intriguing issue addressed was the role of mo r a Is
in the courtroom, as we1I as the judge's duty of separating his or her
morals from those of society.

According to one respondent, judges share

central moral values (such as the belief that murder is morally wrong)
with the rest of society.

This expert did not see that the morals of the two

entities would usually conflict, but contended that it is the judge's
responsibility to resist public pressure if the citizenry presses for a hasty
decision based solely on emotions.

In rare cases where the judge

1s

not

guided by the morals of society, he must structure the decision so that
morals will be analytically separated from the legal question.

An

important finding was that every expert agreed that judges cannot
completely separate their morals from the decision-making process.

Five

went beyond the view that morals cannot be separated from a judge's role
as leader in contending that morals should
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not be separated.

A judge's responsibility, according to three interviewees, 1s to
interpret laws as consistently as possible in relation to one's personal value
system.

If a situation arises where a judge is in danger of being unfairly

biased because of certain moral values, then it is his or her responsibility
to recuse him or herself from the case.

It seems that these experts would

agree with Justice Cardozo's view that human nature and other
subconscious forces would make complete objectivity an impossibility.

One

interviewee argued that judges cannot ignore their role as moral leaders,
and that a judge must 1) educate herself about different moral viewpoints,
2) consult with others, and 3) lead by example in order to lead effectively.
In essence, a judge should acknowledge, not ignore, moral views, for
morality is not merely a subject of leadership.

Rather, it is the

underpinnings of every subject of leadership.

Six of the respondents

agreed with this view that a judge must be aware of his or her
subjectivity.

A judge must acknowledge, rather than ignore, personal

views so that he or she can effectively manage them.

Ethics and morals

are fundamental to justice, so a judge simply cannot neglect the
importance of these concepts.

Again, this finding supports the claim that

judges should not be expected to divorce themselves from their morals, for
doing so is both impractical and impossible.
Whether or not judges are moral leaders was another major area of
discussion.

Six respondents believed that judges do serve in this capacity,

while one viewed judges as moral role models or moral examples, and not
moral leaders.

In this expert's view, judges must not outwardly express

their moral views, and the role of moral leadership belongs primarily to
religious and political leaders.

The other six respondents held a decidedly

opposite view, for they believe that judges act as moral leaders via their
opinions, behavior, precedents set, and the manner in which they conduct
court proceedings.

Two interviwees held a similar position in stating that

judges are often responsible for making decisions that are not congruent
with popular opinion. In cases such as these, a strong sense of moral
convictions will inevitably lie behind legal interpretation.

However, if a

judge fails to acknowledge a law that supports something that he or she
does not believe in (i.e.. the death penalty), he or she must work within the
bounds of the law and the will of the majority.

While morals play a

significant role, they are not the only influence a judge must consider.
Even in the observed court proceedings in which the judge possessed
a great deal of discretion, six respondents agreed that a judge stiJl faces
several limitations;

legal and statutory guidelines, the facts of the

particular case, the integrity of the judge limiting him or herself to those
facts, respect for the legislature (and the will of the majority it expresses),
interpretations made by higher courts, and the utilitarian nature of court
decisions.

If a judge cannot abide by the laws of the land strictly due to a

certain belief, noted two interviewees, he or she should refuse to hear that
particular case (or find another line of work!).

These sentiments support

the claim made earlier that a judge cannot ignore his or her morals, but
may not be solely guided by personal values.
A judge•s personal conduct outside of his or her professional role was
the only area in which any of the respondents completely disagreed.
Seven experts believed that judges have a duty to carry themselves in a
moral and professional fashion at all times, for there exists a certain
decorum that judges are constantly expected to maintain.
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Another

important aspect of leading a responsible private life is the perception of
neutrality and professionalism required of judges.

This view, shared by a

majority of the respondents, supports the notion that judges, unlike
"normal" citizens, have to live by a higher standard.

On the other side of

the spectrum, one expert held that a judge does not necessarily have to be
a good person to be a good judge, for a judge that is considered to be a
"rotten" person can possibly fulfill the role of judge as long as he or she
possesses a keen sense of fairness and justice.

One expert's view lies in the

middle of the other interviewees', for he said that it takes a moral person
to be a good judge, but the fair and efficient administration of justice is
more important than the type of person adjudicating a given case.
The responses discussed above concur with many of the positions
aruged in this paper.

The interviewees agreed that judges are leaders, and

six of them believed that judges are moral leaders.

In addition, all stated

the notion that judges simply cannot completely ignore their own moral
convictions.

Lastly, all agreed that morals do, indeed, find their way into

the courtroom.

Although a judge may deal with morals in different ways,

it is difficult to dispute the contention that morals do play a significant role
in the adjudication of justice.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The intent of this project was to explore the issues concerning the
controversy

surrounding judges, leadership, and morality.

Through

extensive research as well as enlightening exchanges of dialogue, it has
hopefully been shown that judges are wedded to their moral values, and
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that to deny otherwise would be to say that judges can do the impossib]e:
separate "who they are" from what they do.

The significance of objectivity

is obviously of utmost importance, but it has hopefu11y been proven that
judges confront constitutional and legal questions with at least some
manifestation of their values.

In addition, a strong case for the position

that judges are moral leaders of our society has been made.

Extensive

research, along with the support of the views of various experts in the
fields of law and ethics, has advocated this stance.
It is hoped that forums like the one created during this project will
continue in the future, and that various organizations wilt continue to work
with one another in order to educate as many people as possible about
such important issues facing the legal community and, ultimately, the
community-at-large.

The study of leadership, particularly in conjunction

with relevant issues in the legal field, can only increase our understanding
of how our nation functions.
Leadership from the Bench:

Are Morals Irrelevant?---Absolutely Not
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APPENDIX B
The following experts on law and ethics have been either
interviewed,

**

observed in court or during the forum, or both:

Loren A. Smith, Chief Judge
United States Court of Federal Claims

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

Dr. Joanne B. Ciulla
Coston Family Chair of Leadership and Ethics
Dr. Azizah al-Hibri
Associate Professor, T.C. Williams School of Law
Hon. Kimberly O'Donnell, Chief Judge
Juveni1e and Domestic Relations Court, City of Richmond
Hon. James Spencer
United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia
Hon. Philip Trompeter
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, City of Roanoke
Hon. Rosemarie Annunziata
Court of Appeals, Commonwealth of Virginia
Hon. Don Lemmons
Circuit Court, City of Richmond
Mary Sue Terry, Adjunct Professor in Political Science and Leadership
Studies (University of Richmond)

APPENDIX C
**

Analysis of interview content was made with permission of all
interviewees.

**

Court observations were made on Monday, March 25, 1996 and
Thursday, March 28, 1996 at the Richmond Juvenile and Domestic
Chief Judge Kimberly O'Donnell presided over the
Relations Court.
hearings.

**

The forum, titled "Leadership from the Bench:
Are Morals Irrelevant?"
took place on Tuesday, April 9, 1996 in Jepson Hall room 1 J 8 at the
The panelists included Hon. Philip Trompeter,
University of Richmond.
Hon. Don Lemmons, Hon. Rosemarie Annunziata, and Hon. James Spencer.
The discussion was moderated by Mary Sue Terry.
It has been videotaped
and is available for viewing.
The program was a collaborative effort between the Cadmus Leader
in-Residence Program, the Jepson School of Leadership Studies, and the T.C.
Williams School of Law.
Members of the coordinating committee included
Judge Kimberly O'Donnell, Dr. Marc Swatez (Jepson School of Leadership
Studies), Associate Dean W. Clark Williams (T.C. Williams School of Law),
and the author of this paper.
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Appendix D
The following is a copy of an article in the April I 0, 1996 edition of
the Richmond Times-Dispatch concerning the forum that was a major
component of this project.
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Judges say
morality
matters

I

Sobriet•
to hem

They cite restraints
as being necessary
BY AUN COOPER
TIMEs-DISPATCH STAFF WRrI'ER
U.S. District Judge James R. Spen
cer recalled the courtesy visits he
paid members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee in 1986 when he was
nominated for a federal judgeship.
Every senator noticed the master
of divinity degree on his r�swne and
asked in some fonn or another how
he could be deeply religious and still
be fair and objective as a judge.
Spencer said he was offended at
the question at the time but has come
to realize that it was appropriate.
The senators were properly con
cerned about whether his religion
would take the fonn of starry-eyed
mysticism or narrow-minded zealot
ry that would override the will of the
majority as expressed in the laws the
senators wrote, Spencer said.
Spencer was one of four judges on

County gets
funds to pay
for daycare
Prince William set ,
far ivelfare program

Staie launching
BY JIM MASON
TIMEs-DISPATCH STAFF WRIT

MAAK �MUS/TIMES-DISPATCH

QUESTION OF MORALITY. JudgN on the panel were (from left) Donald W. Lernon1, RaNmarle An1mnzlata,
Philip J. Tronapete, and James R. Spencer. Former VlrBlnla Attorney General Mary Sue Terry moderated.
a panel . that discussed "Leadership
from the Bench: Is Morality Rele
vant?" last night at the Jepson School
at the University of Richmond.
The other panelists were Virginia
Court of Appeals Judge Rosemarie
Annunziati., Richmond Circuit Judge
Donald W. Lemons and Judge Philip
J. Trompeter of the Roanoke Juvenile
and Domestic Relations District
Court. Fonner Virginia Attorney
General Mary Sue Terry moderated.
Lemons said the imposition of mo
rality is inevitable in judging because
there is no purely objective judge.
The better question is where are the

restraints on imposing that morality.
He listed several: the facts of a
particular case and the integrity of
the judge in limiting himself to those
facts, respect for the legislature and
will of the majority it expresses, the
binding inte11>retations of the law by
higher courts, and the utiliti.rian na
ture of court decisions.
Annunziati. said those constraints
make it difficult for a judge to fulfill
"our common notion of a leader."
Judges are most effective as leaders
when they fill in gaps in the law, but
they also are important symbols of
how the third branch of government

should operate, she said.
Spencer noted that judges often
must consider "competing values,
both coming from the community.''
He cited as an example the display of
a homoerotic painting outside an art
gallery in Shockoe Bottom several
years ago. Many members of the
community were outraged by the
painting, which he found "totally dis•
gusting" but still concluded was pro
tected by the First Amendment.
"It's times like these that I thank
God for life tenure ... which makes
these kinds of judgments easier,"
Spencer said.

Virginia's biggest-ever caI
to promote safe and sober r
will be lawiched here Friday n
an unspecffied sobriety chec
by Richmond and Chesterfield
ty police officers and state trc
Attorney General James 1
more
will join State Police
intendent M. Wayne Huggins
kick off the campaign. Similar
points, teaming state and local
are also planned Friday night i
fax County and Norfolk.

m

Made possible by a $200,0(
era! grant, officers and troope
also urge compliance with spe1
its and encourage drivers and
seat passengers to buckle up
"Far too many motorists taJ.
and sober driving for grante
this is the bottom line: the
primary elements are driving

Teen-ager shot in hack recounts
attack at trial of third defendan�
tence on convictions of robbery, us
ing a fireann in a felony and accesso
TIMES-DISPATCH STAFF WRITER
ry after the fact to malicious wound
In a matter-of-fact voice that belied
ing.
the terror of the event, a 15-year-old .
. Wilkerson was sentenced to eight
boy described the night last fall when
years on convictions of robbery and
•
thtee newfound friends attacked and
r.. � •
,... .
BY DEBORAH KELLY

The victim, whose name is
withheld because of his age, rr
three defendants on the night
Sept. 29 shooting at a football
in Chesterfield County. They v
the youth_to3.et them marijuar

